

**STATE OF MICHIGAN**  
**COURT OF APPEALS**

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In the Matter of D.A.W., J.B.W., K.N.W., and  
L.M.W., Minors.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

NICOLE IRENE GRESS,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JOHN WOOD,

Respondent.

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In the Matter of J.G. and C.E.U., Minors.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

NICOLE IRENE GRESS,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JOHN WOOD, KEVIN HERBERT, and  
CHARLES JOHNSON,

Respondents.

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UNPUBLISHED  
February 21, 2003

No. 241307  
Macomb Circuit Court  
Family Division  
LC No. 99-048091-NA

No. 241308  
Macomb Circuit Court  
Family Division  
LC No. 99-048091-NA

Before: Markey, P.J., and Smolenski and Meter, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court orders terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (j), and (1). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). D.A.W. was originally taken into custody because of respondent-appellant's neglect and her failure to protect him from abuse by her live-in partner. Respondent-appellant's other five children were subsequently removed because of their mother's inability to provide proper care for them and her lack of suitable housing.

In the two-year period her children were in foster care, respondent-appellant was never able to care for her children successfully, even in a supervised setting, and did not acquire appropriate housing. Further, there was evidence that respondent-appellant was still involved with respondent Wood, who had a documented history of violence and serious mental illness. Moreover, respondent-appellant's parenting ability was not expected to improve because of the problems associated with her closed-head injury. Lastly, in regards to respondent-appellant's parental rights to J.G. and C.E.U., a statutory basis for termination existed because of the court's prior termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights to her other children. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent-appellant's parental rights to the children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane E. Markey  
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski  
/s/ Patrick M. Meter